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Transformations of the State – 
From Monopolist to Manager of Political Authority 
ABSTRACT 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the gradual nationalization of political 
authority that was typical for much of the State’s history since the seventeenth century 
has come to a standstill and given way to the denationalization of political authority. 
Non-state actors acquire political authority, thus giving rise to a complex network of 
political authorities, in which the State is only one authority among others. Yet, the de-
nationalization of political authority remains fragmentary and incomplete. No non-state 
authority, be it an international institution, a private business or transnational organiza-
tion, has the capacity to supplant the State. In fact, they all remain reliant on the State 
because only the State can provide the complementary resources that non-state actors 
lack to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately. For this reason, the State 
remains the key body of authority despite denationalization and the accretion of political 
authority by non-state entities. Its role has changed, however. The State no longer exer-
cises authority always directly and exclusively through its own powers and resources, 
but more and more indirectly, by providing and complementing the powers and re-
sources of non-state actors. The state remains the central authority but its role is trans-
forming: once monopolist, the state is now becoming a manager of political authority.  
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Transformations of the State – 
From Monopolist to Manager of Political Authority 
1 HOW IS THE STATE ADAPTING? 
Who exercises political authority? Until recently, the answer to this question was clear: 
the State. Today, however, it is a matter of some debate whether the State is still the 
central body of political authority. In the 1980s, a vocal body of opinion began to 
emerge claiming that the State is becoming weaker: it is past its peak; its political au-
thority is being eroded by globalization; it may face terminal decline (Reinhard 2007: 
122, 1999; Camilieri/Falk 1992, Zacher 1992). What is left is an empty, powerless, in-
stitutional shell (Strange 1996).  
This “end of the State” perspective has drawn criticism from two different quarters. 
Scholars coming from a statist perspective doubt that a fundamental weakening of the 
State is taking place at all. They claim that the State has retained its former strength and 
is “alive and well” (Krasner 2001). Its political authority was never unchallenged, and 
consequently it cannot be expected to be different today (Thompson 1994). Its dominant 
position is not fundamentally jeopardized, not even through the globalization process. 
After all, the State itself was the driving force behind this process (Streeck 2004). Ad-
mittedly, it adapts its policy profile to globalized conditions, but its ability to do so is in 
itself an expression of its undaunted viability and strength (Garrett 1998; Levy 2006, 
Weiss 1998). Scholars from a governance perspective, on the other hand, contend that 
the State is not the only possible unit of political rule. Authority, they argue, is increas-
ingly exercised “without government” (Rosenau/Czempiel. 1992) by institutions “be-
yond the State” (Zürn 1998), i.e. by international institutions (Zürn et al. 2007) and 
transgovernmental administrative networks (Slaughter 2004), through global public-
private partnerships (Reinicke 1998), civil society networks (Keck/Sikkink 1998) and 
private actors (Cutler et al. 1999). The – possible – decline of the State should not, 
therefore, be equated with a decline of political authority per se.  
In this paper, we argue that both the statist and the governance perspective are 
broadly correct but each suffers from specific blind spots. The governance perspective 
is correct in emphasizing the growing governance role of non-state actors, i.e. of inter-
national institutions, private entities and transnational organizations. Frequently, how-
ever, the proponents of this perspective are so absorbed in analyzing the increased po-
litical authority of non-state entities that they overlook how crucially these entities de-
pend on state support in order to function effectively and legitimately. The statist per-
spective, by contrast, is correct in stressing the continuing centrality of the State in po-
litical affairs. It tends to overlook, however, that the reason for this centrality is chang-
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ing. It no longer lies solely, or even most importantly, in the State’s exclusive, quasi-
monopolistic claim to political authority but, increasingly, in its ability to manage and 
complement denationalized (i.e. internationalized, privatized or transnationalized) au-
thority.  
In order to adjust for these blind spots we explore empirically the interplay of state 
and non-state authority in the ‘OECD-world’ of advanced western democracies. Aiming 
at a more adequate description of the state at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, 
we proceed in three steps. First, we briefly sketch how, beginning in early modern 
times, the emerging State gradually divested non-state authorities such as pope and em-
peror, the aristocracy, guilds and municipalities of their independent rights and powers 
(Section 2). This nationalization of political authority continued until, by the twentieth 
century, there was a broad congruence between State authority and (legitimate) political 
authority in advanced western states. In a second step, we show how at least since the 
1970s the trend has reversed and a denationalization of political authority has taken 
place (Section 3). Political authority is – again – asserted by international, private and 
transnational (i.e. non-state) institutions. Finally, in a third step, we show that the dena-
tionalization of authority does not make the state redundant but remains fundamentally 
dependent on it – at least for the time being. Denationalization itself becomes a remit of 
the State. The State remains crucial, but its role is changing from that of a “monopolist 
of political authority” to a “manager of political authority” (Section 4). We conclude by 
summarizing our findings, highlighting some of their limitations and discussing how 
they reflect on the competing perspectives on the future of the State mentioned above 
(Section 5).  
2 THE NATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
A State is defined as an organization specialized in exercising political authority within 
a given territory and over the people in that territory. Political authority is the capacity, 
firstly, to make collectively binding decisions (decision-making competence), secondly, 
to implement such decisions with the appropriate organizational means (organizational 
competence) and, thirdly, to give these decisions normative justification so as to in-
crease the likelihood of “quasi-voluntary compliance” (Levi 1988) by the subjects of 
authority (legitimatory power). Although “specialists” in exercising political authority 
already existed in antiquity, a new feature of the modern State is that it monopolized it – 
or at least attempted to. Not only did the modern State do “only” politics, it also aspired 
to do “all” politics (Poggi 1990). In some countries such as Britain,  France or Sweden, 
the nationalization of political authority began quite early, while in other countries, like 
Germany, for instance, it took much longer. But wherever it occurred, the history of the 
modern State can be seen as the progressive extension and monopolization of political 
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authority (Reinhard 1999, 2007). On the one hand the competences to make binding 
decisions and organize their implementation were gradually nationalized – a process 
which we shall call instrumental nationalization (1.1); and on the other hand, by institu-
tionalizing democratic as well as rule of law principles, the State gradually nationalized 
the power to legitimize political authority – we shall call this legitimatory nationaliza-
tion (1.2).1 
2.1 Instrumental Nationalization 
The nationalization of political authority began with the gradual monopolization of de-
cision-making powers by the State. The rising State successively stripped non-state au-
thorities such as the church, the aristocracy, guilds and municipalities of their autono-
mous decision-making powers (Spruyt 1994), first in the areas of security and taxation 
and later also in other areas (Tilly 1990): traditional feuds were prohibited, traditional 
feudal tributes were abolished or marginalized, as gradually the State established its 
exclusive claim to legitimate force and taxation (Elias 1969). Already in the Age of Ab-
solutism the State also began to intervene in economic processes (North 1981). It de-
cided on the construction of public infrastructures such as roads, ports, canals, on land 
reclamation and cultivation. In the nineteenth century it laid the foundations for a na-
tional market economy by granting the freedom of trade, codifying private law and uni-
fying monetary systems. In the twentieth century, economic policy became a central 
remit of the State. Spurred by the two world wars, it began to control investment deci-
sions and regulate prices, to fund industrial research and stabilize macro-economic 
processes. The State also concerned itself with social welfare; it passed decisions on 
educational matters, poor relief, health care, retirement pensions, unemployment com-
pensation or child labour (Alber 1982; Pierson 1991). Even matters that were originally 
not perceived as public, from the environment to the arts, sports, gender, childcare and 
the protection of non-smokers, have meanwhile become subject to the decision-making 
powers of the State (Kaufmann 1996).  
The nationalization of decision-making powers was accompanied by the appropria-
tion of organizational competences by the State. Originally, the State was dependent on 
non-state actors for the implementation of its decisions. It succeeded in reducing this 
dependency by successively expanding its own administrative structures. In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries it replaced the mercenary armies, which it had initially 
needed to disarm the aristocracy, with standing armies (Thomson 1994). Later, locally 
                                                 
1  We use the term “nationalization” to indicate any gradual shift of political authority from non-state actors to state 
agencies regardless of whether the respective state is a nation-state. We, hence, use the term “nationalization” in 
the sense of “etatization”.  
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organized and funded police forces were placed under state supervision, and tax farmers 
were replaced by public tax administrations (Tilly 1990). The State also took over the 
organizational responsibility for public services such as the postal services and road-
building, water supplies and refuse disposal, railways and telegraphy, radio broadcast-
ing and air traffic control (North 1981; Spruyt 1994). Education and social welfare were 
transferred from the auspices of the Church or charity organizations either to state ad-
ministrative bodies such as public health services and public schools and universities, or 
to parastatal bodies such as compulsory social insurances. Later the state, using its own 
administration or parastatal agencies, even ran public museums, community sports fa-
cilities, saving banks and public broadcasting companies. 
2.2  Legitimatory Nationalization  
The increased nationalization of decision-making and organizational authority was ac-
companied by the State’s appropriation of the power to legitimize authority. The notion 
of the divine right of kings (and queens) was supplanted by contractual conceptions of 
the State (Elias 1969) and absolutist rule was superseded by the constitutionalization of 
the State, i.e. by the gradual establishment of the rule of law and the democratization of 
political decision-making procedures. While initially forced upon the State by revolu-
tionary movements, this process of constitutionalization proved to be vital for enhanc-
ing the State’s legitimatory power. The history of constitutionalization began with the 
Bill of Rights in England in the late seventeenth century and was furthered by the revo-
lutions in America and France in the late eighteenth century, but did not prevail in all 
Western European countries until two hundred years later with the fall of the authoritar-
ian regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece and, finally, in most East European countries 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
The constitutional state rests on two pillars that have contributed to it being con-
ceived as having the legitimacy to rule: democracy and the rule of law. Put simply, the 
principle of the rule of law means that individuals should be governed by generally ap-
plicable and publicly known laws, and should have equal access to effective legal reme-
dies if their rights are infringed under these laws. The institutional backbone of the rule 
of law is an independent judiciary that (a) gives all citizens equal access to the courts, 
and (b) ensures that the courts judge all actions on the basis of their legal merits alone 
rather than their political or social implications. Democracy means that all citizens 
should have an equal chance to actively participate and be heard in public decision-
making processes on issues affecting them. In institutional terms, this usually implies 
(a) the election of legislative bodies by universal suffrage (active participation) and (b) 
the open and undistorted deliberation over the normative appropriateness and factual 
effectiveness of public decisions and decision-making agendas.  
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The constitution both constitutes and constrains the States’ claim to political author-
ity at the same time (Grimm 2003). Constitutionally bound to the principles of democ-
racy and the rule of law, the state becomes an agent of the interests and liberties of its 
citizens (Elias 1969; Held 1995). This allows citizens to understand themselves as a 
society that governs itself through the State, and thus increases the perceived legitimacy 
of the State. At the same time it reduces the legitimacy of non-state actors. Their claims 
to authority come under suspicion of being illegitimate. Democracy and the rule of law 
become the exclusive domains of the State – a state monopoly in which non-state actors 
may participate but to which they have no claim in their own right. 
2.3 The State – (quasi) Monopolist of Political Authority 
The nationalization of decision-making and organizational competences as well as of 
the power to legitimize these competences was a gradual, uneven and discontinuous 
process (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994). Different states pursued divergent paths, which all, 
however, led to an unprecedented concentration of political authority in the hands of the 
State in the twentieth century (Reinhard 1999, 2007). This near-monopoly of political 
power gave the State the destructive potential that made political catastrophes on the 
scale of German National Socialism, Soviet Communism and the two world wars possi-
ble. On the other hand it turned the State into an ideal instrument for political self-
determination: as political authority lay almost completely in state hands, it was possi-
ble, through the constitutionalization of the State, to bind all political authority to prin-
ciples of democracy and the rule of law (Grimm 2004). The state monopoly over au-
thority did not imply totalitarian rule; it only implied that within the national territory 
there was essentially only one political authority, namely the State. And if that State 
was a constitutional state, then its authority could in principle remain fairly restricted. 
Nor did it imply that non-state actors had no role to play in exercising political author-
ity. International institutions have been a feature of international politics since the nine-
teenth century, and private business and federations have remained deeply involved in 
the management of policy fields such as social security or transport. The state monopoly 
over political authority did imply, however, that the activities of these non-state actors 
were closely supervised and directed by the state. Rather than competing as an alterna-
tive to the rule of the State, they constituted bridgeheads of the State into the interna-
tional and social realms. It might therefore seem more appropriate to classify them as 
‘parastatal’ actors (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) rather than non-state actors. Finally, the 
state monopoly over the means of effective and legitimate authority did not imply that 
the State was always an effective or legitimate ruler. It did mean, however, that ineffi-
ciencies and legitimacy deficits were inevitably blamed on the State. For the State, 
claiming overall responsibility for political authority also implied assuming ultimate 
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responsibility for failures in the exercise of authority. If anything went wrong, the State 
was the final addressee for the allocation of blame and calls for assistance. 
3 THE DENATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
The gradual nationalization of political authority, which had characterized state devel-
opment in countries of today’s OECD world since the 17th century, came to a standstill 
in the second half of the 20th century, with the 1970s marking a reversal back towards a 
new denationalization of authority (Zürn 1998; Reinhard 1999).2 Non-state actors 
(re-)claim decision-making competencies, organizational capacities and legitimatory 
power of their own, eroding the State’s near monopoly of political rule. Depending on 
whether these non-state actors are public or private, and whether they relate to national 
or transnational territories (Walter 2001), three types of non-state authorities can be 
distinguished (Table 1): 
 International Actors are inter-state institutions like the United Nations Organi-
zation (UNO) or the European Union (EU). They derive their public legal 
status from that of their member states; unlike states, however, their authority 
is not restricted to a national territory but extends across national borders. If in-
ternational institutions gain authority, this process is called internationaliza-
tion.  
 Private Actors are non-state institutions such as federations, associations, co-
operative societies and businesses. They differ from state institutions in par-
ticular in terms of their private legal status, but as with states their authoritative 
functions are restricted to the national territory. If the authority of private ac-
tors grows, then we call this process privatization. 
 Transnational Actors, like private actors, are federations, associations and 
businesses which, however, unlike private actors, exercise their authority be-
yond the borders of individual state territories. This is especially characteristic 
of transnational associations and federations – so-called Non-Government Or-
ganizations, or NGOs. A growth in the significance of transnational actors in 
the administration of authority is referred to as transnationalization. 
                                                 
2  We use the term “denationalization” to indicate any gradual shift of political authority from state actors to non-
state entities, regardless of whether the respective state was a nation-state. The term is meant to denote any proc-
ess that reverses the “nationalization” – in the sense of etatization – of political authority. 
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Table 1: State and Non-State Authorities 
 National  
Territory 
Transnational  
Territory 
Public Status State Actors International Actors 
Private Status Private Actors  Transnational Actors  
 
In the following we describe how international, private and transnational actors acquire 
their autonomous decision-making and organizational competences – which we catego-
rize together as instrumental forms of denationalization – (3.1), and whether and to what 
extent the same actors appropriate their own power of legitimation – which we catego-
rize as legitimatory forms of denationalization (3.2). 
3.1 Instrumental Denationalization 
The denationalization of decision-making and organizational authority follows a typical 
pattern (Table 2): international institutions gain decision-making competences, but not 
necessarily organizational responsibility; sometimes they even lose organizational com-
petences. Private actors, by contrast, gain organizational competences but often lose 
decision-making authority. Only transnational organizations win more decision-making 
powers and more organizational responsibility.  
Table 2: Denationalization of Decision-making and Organizational Competence  
 Decision-making 
Competence 
Organizational  
Competence 
International Actors Increasing  Decreasing 
Private Actors Decreasing Increasing 
Transnational Actors Increasing Increasing 
 
3.1.1 Internationalization 
The significance of international actors as decision-making authorities has increased 
substantively. Of course, international institutions are not a new phenomenon. The Uni-
versal Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union, or the International Union of 
Railways all originated back in the 19th century, and almost all of the international in-
stitutions of central importance today were established in the 1940s and 1950s: the UN, 
NATO, EU, GATT, OECD, IMF, IBRD etc. (Rittberger/Zangl 2006:25-57). What is 
new, however, is the wider range of issues falling under the decision-making compe-
tence of international institutions. They are no longer restricted to coordinating national 
policies at the border but are also concerned with unifying and harmonizing policies 
behind the border (wider scope). What is also new is that these institutions are becom-
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ing increasingly autonomous. Their decision-making processes are no longer com-
pletely under the control of the member states (autonomization) (Zangl/Zürn 2003: 206-
245).  
Wider scope of International Decision-making Competences: There is hardly an is-
sue area today which is not to some extent regulated by the decisions of international 
institutions (Hurrelmann et al. 2007; Leibfried/Zürn 2005). Even in core areas of na-
tional sovereignty, international institutions increasingly exercise their decision-making 
powers. The UN asserts the authority to order the freezing of bank accounts of sus-
pected terrorists, the international Criminal Court (ICC) issues arrest warrants against 
war criminals such as Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic. The European Court 
of Human Rights condemned the employment bans imposed on alleged political ex-
tremists. And the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sent a 
delegation of observers to the USA in 2004 to monitor the presidential elections. How-
ever, it is in the economic sphere where international decision-making competences 
have extended furthest. The World Trade Organization (WTO) decides, for example, 
over whether European states must permit the sale of American meat from livestock 
treated with hormones, and what tax privileges the US may offer export businesses. And 
the decisions of the EU penetrate far into the domestic realm of its member states: VAT 
rates, budget deficits, gambling concessions, university entrance requirements, company 
pension schemes, TV and radio broadcasting, promotion of the arts – all these and simi-
lar issues are today regulated, or at least, co-regulated through decisions made at the 
European level.  
The Autonomization of International Decision-Making Competences: International 
institutions not only penetrate further into the domestic politics of states, they also in-
creasingly do so without individual member states being able to control their decision 
making (Zangl/Zürn 2003: 206-245; Zürn et al. 2007). This is testified by the growing 
decision-making powers of supranational bodies and transgovernmental administrative 
networks. Although formally, transgovernmental networks such as the so-called EU 
comitology only prepare and implement decisions that are made by the relevant inter-
governmental bodies, in reality decision-making is often largely left to them (Slaughter 
2004). By establishing cross-border ties between national bureaucrats, they relax the 
States’ hierarchical control over these bureaucrats and thus gain a measure of autonomy 
(Joerges/Godt 2005). At the same time, the precision of international decisions in-
creases, the monitoring of compliance is successively centralized, and the mediation of 
rule conflicts is increasingly delegated to supranational dispute settlement bodies. This 
constrains national discretion in interpreting international decisions. Under the old 
GATT, for instance, states were able to judge unilaterally whether, say, a given level of 
market disruption justified a deviation from free-trade obligations. Since the establish-
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ment of the WTO, however, this possibility is severely restricted. The WTO specifies in 
detail how to verify market disruptions, and how, if at all, states may react to them. If, 
moreover, disputes arise over national reactions to market disruptions, it is not the states 
themselves, but the largely supranational dispute settlement body of the WTO which 
decides on their legality (Zangl 2006).  
The Decline of International Organizational Competences: Despite their growing 
decision-making powers, international institutions have not necessarily gained organiza-
tional competence. This is remarkable, given that many international institutions were 
originally founded for organizational – rather than decision-making – purposes. The UN 
Charter envisaged the UN having their own troops to stabilize peace; the World Bank 
was established to facilitate reconstruction in war-torn Europe through development 
loans, the IMF was founded to stabilize the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system 
with temporary loans to countries in current account deficit, and NATO built up inte-
grated command and logistic centres to organize the defence of Western Europe. Intel-
sat was tasked with setting up a global network of news satellites, the International Cof-
fee Organization (ICO) with administering buffer stocks to stabilize coffee prices, and 
the EU, too, was originally founded to provide a variety of organizational services such 
as the promotion of the European steel and nuclear industries as well as European agri-
culture. Today, many of these institutions, such as Intelsat have become completely 
redundant, or the significance of their organizational competence has diminished – at 
least for OECD countries. The World Bank loans never had the relevance that was an-
ticipated in 1945, and no core OECD country has taken out an IMF loan since the late 
1970s. Only with regard to non-OECD countries have international institutions been 
able to expand their organizational competences. This is true of the UN, for instance, 
which took over transitional governmental authority in Kosovo and in East Timor using 
its own financial and administrative resources. This is also true of the IMF and World 
Bank loans, which are now given exclusively to developing countries and countries in 
transition outside of the OECD. And it is true of all the special UN organizations such 
as the Children’s Emergency Fund, the High Commissioner for Refugees or its Devel-
opment Programme. 
3.1.2 Privatization 
In contrast to international institutions, private actors have mainly acquired organiza-
tional competencies. Organizational tasks that were previously administered by state 
agencies are delegated to private actors, and newly arising organizational tasks are often 
assigned to private actors right from the outset. Of course, the delegation of public or-
ganizational tasks to private actors is nothing new. In many states the provision of elec-
tricity, gas, water or the operation of airports, waterways and rail transport always rested 
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at least to some degree with private actors, often for fiscal reasons. Some pension 
schemes and health insurances have always been private, too. What is new is the growth 
in the significance of private actors as organizational agencies. In more and more sensi-
tive issue areas, key organizational competences are provided by private rather than 
state actors (wider scope) (Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 2006; Schneider/Tenbücken 2004). 
What is also new is the growing autonomy with which private actors utilize their organ-
izational competences (autonomization). The direct control of the State is weakening. 
The shadow of state hierarchy is fading.  
Wider scope of Private Organizational Competences: There are hardly any issue ar-
eas today in which private actors are completely excluded from public organizational 
tasks. Public security is no longer provided by the police forces alone, but increasingly 
also by private security firms. Private security guards now patrol railway stations and 
shopping centres. Airlines forward security-relevant passenger information to the secu-
rity forces. Banks are called upon to cooperate in campaigns against money laundering 
and organized crime. The armed forces draw upon private security companies not only 
to set up camps, carry out vehicle maintenance and provide the catering, but also, as is 
currently happening in Iraq, to provide bodyguards for American government staff, in-
terrogate prisoners and carry out assignments for the secret services (Singer 2003). Even 
in the area of tax administration, some states experiment with the privatization of tasks 
such as the collection of tax debts. Of course, the privatization trend in the public utili-
ties and one-time state-dominated industries is much more prominent. Most airlines are 
now privatized, and the provision of gas, water, electricity, telecommunications, postal 
services and rail transport is now increasingly organized by private businesses (Ehni et 
al. 2004). State involvement in “strategically” vital industries such as coal, steel, arms, 
or banking and insurance, is gradually being reduced, and state subsidies for private 
businesses are being cut back. Many economic steering functions hitherto carried out by 
state or parastatal institutions, such as for instance Swedish pension insurance, German 
savings banks or the Japanese post office bank system, are now in the hands of private 
investment companies. 
The Autonomization of Private Organizational Competences: The expansion of pri-
vate organizational competences goes hand in hand with their autonomization. This is 
most apparent where state-owned, or state-administered, enterprises are privatized and 
sold to private investors, as has often happened with airlines, telecommunications com-
panies or the utilities. It is also the case when parastatal actors are deprived of their spe-
cial privileges and exposed to market competition, for instance when public contracts 
are no longer automatically passed to a few privileged appointed suppliers but awarded 
by tender. And it is the case where new organizational tasks such as the management of 
cellular networks or road toll collection systems are assigned to private actors right from 
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the start instead of being assumed by state authorities. The direct organizational control 
that the State was previously able to exert is dwindling. For instance, it is losing its grip 
on how much a private water supplier should invest on the maintenance of the water 
supply system, how often a railway network operator should overhaul which stretch of 
the track, or how many workers it employs and under what conditions. More fundamen-
tally, the State loses control over who assumes certain organizational tasks – former 
state-owned enterprises or private competitors, local building companies or their foreign 
rivals. In one notable case, the Senate of Berlin was forced to award the contract for its 
internal mail administration to the PIN Group on the basis of its low bid, although it 
subsequently had to subsidize the low wages of the PIN workers through supplementary 
benefit (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 14.08.2007).  
The Decline of Private Decision-Making Competences: While the organizational re-
sponsibilities of private actors are on the increase, their decision-making competences 
tend to be in decline. In former parastatal sectors, where hitherto the State respected or 
even encouraged private self-regulation, it increasingly assumes direct regulatory re-
sponsibility. And where, in a neo-corporatist context, private actors were directly in-
volved in state decision-making processes, their influence has been reduced. In Great 
Britain, for instance, the largely autonomous self-regulatory mechanisms of the capital 
markets are now increasingly being re-shaped by state regulation (Moran 2006; 
Zimmermann 2007). Since the 1990s, the mandatory health insurance companies in 
Germany, which traditionally enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in fixing contribution 
rates and negotiating fees with healthcare providers, are bound to increasingly stricter 
guidelines stipulated by the State (Rothgang et al. 2006). And in the Netherlands, the 
State has markedly strengthened its position in corporate decision-making processes, 
and even excluded the social partners completely from certain socio-political decision-
making processes (Hemerijck/Vail 2006).  
3.1.3 Transnationalization 
Unlike international and private bodies, transnational actors frequently gain both deci-
sion-making powers and organizational capacities. They not only make collectively 
binding decisions, but often also implement them through their own organizational re-
sources. Again, transnational institutions are not new; the Catholic Church is several 
hundred years old, and the Red Cross and the International Olympic Committee also 
date back more than a hundred years. Nor is the relative autonomy of their operations 
new; in fact, it is a constituent part of this type of actor. What is new, however, is the 
growth in number and importance of transnational organizations (Shanks et al. 1996; 
Cutler et al. 1999) and the increasing scope of their decision-making and organizational 
authority (wider scope).  
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Wider Scope of Transnational Decision-making Competences: The issue areas in 
which transnational actors exercise no decision-making or organizational competence 
are growing few and far between. The influence of transnational organizations is par-
ticularly salient in the area of technical standardization, which for a long time was 
dominated by national standards institutions such as the German Standards Institute 
(DIN) in Germany. The decisions made by existing organizations such as the Interna-
tional Standards Organization (ISO) are increasing, and new transnational standardiza-
tion organizations such as ETSI or ICANN are emerging. Administrative standards have 
gained significance, too, and some of them are set by transnational organizations, as in 
the case of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (Zimmermann 2007). 
Rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s provide uniform ratings of 
credit risks of public and private debtors (Kerwer 2002). In the context of the so-called 
lex mercatoria, international law firms standardize contract structures for international 
trade, and thus establish transnational norms that facilitate cross-border transactions 
(Callies 2004). International sports associations have created a transnational sports law 
– or lex sportiva – and various transnational internet organizations are working on the 
so-called lex informatica – an autonomous internet law (Leib 2004; Lehmkuhl 2004). 
Since the 1990s, transnational associations have drawn up codes of conduct to which 
multinational companies subscribe to mark their commitment to minimum environ-
mental, labour and health standards (Hassel 2008).  
Wider scope of Transnational Organizational Competences: In addition to decision-
making powers, transnational organizations often exercise organizational powers. The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and other international sports associations in-
volved in drawing up the lex sportiva organize major international sporting events such 
as the Olympic Games or world championships, and draw up anti-doping procedures in 
order to detect individual athletes who have taken performance-enhancing drugs and 
disqualify them from competitive events (Lehmkuhl 2004). ICANN, one of the central 
institutions behind the lex informatica, has similar administrative powers. Most impor-
tantly, it controls the server that administers domain names, and is able to remove do-
main names used for illicit purposes from the web (Leib 2004). Another example of 
transnational organizational competences are the numerous relief organizations such as 
Médecins sans Frontières or the increasing number of private foundations such as the 
Gates Foundation, which carry out tasks traditionally reserved for state development aid 
policy.  
3.2 Legitimatory Denationalization 
Is the accretion of both decision-making powers and organizational competences by 
non-state authorities accompanied by an increase in their legitimatory powers? In this 
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section, we analyse the efforts of non-state actors to democratize their decision making 
and establish an internal rule of law in order to develop their own sources of legitimacy. 
By doing so, we assume, that such efforts would strengthen their perceived legitimacy. 
We find that international and transnational institutions indeed push towards a partial 
constitutionalization of their decision-making procedures and dispute settlement ar-
rangements, while private actors, by contrast, make no efforts in this direction.  
Table 3: Denationalization of Legitimatory Powers 
 Democratic Principles Rule of Law Principles 
International Actors Partially Increasing  Partially Increasing  
Private Actors Decreasing Decreasing 
Transnational Actors Partially Increasing  Partially Increasing 
 
3.2.1 Internationalization 
There is indeed a pervasive trend towards democratization in international institutions 
(Held 1995). However, the implementation of the fundamental principles of democracy 
– guaranteed options for individual participation in legislative bodies and institutional-
ized public deliberation – remains fragmentary and incomplete. In particular, interna-
tional institutions offer hardly any access points for individual participation in their leg-
islative processes. Citizens usually have no means to call power holders in international 
institutions to account for legislation they disagree with (Grant/Keohane 2005; Steffek 
2008). Directly elected parliaments are absent in international institutions. The Euro-
pean Parliament is the only exception in this respect, while NATO, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe have rather insignificant parliamentary assemblies.  
However, most international institutions have now at least established some basic 
pre-conditions for an informed public deliberation over their legislative decisions and 
practices. Legislative processes that used to be dominated by secretive diplomatic nego-
tiations between state representatives are now gradually becoming more transparent and 
open to the participation of stakeholders. Practically every international organization 
now includes hearings in its law-making processes in an effort to involve relevant 
stakeholders (Nanz/Steffek 2007; Steffek et al. 2007). The participation of civil society 
actors in global negotiation processes on issues such as the protection of the ozone 
layer, on climate change or on banning landmines may serve as examples here. To be 
sure, even routine stakeholder participation does not guarantee free and unbiased delib-
eration. Yet it tends to increase the onus on states to justify their respective bargaining 
positions not only in terms of national interests but also from the point of view of com-
mon transnational interests (Zangl/Zürn 2003: 246-268). 
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The incomplete democratization of international institutions is accompanied by an 
equally incomplete adoption of the rule of law. Of the two basic rule of law principles, 
namely, that individuals should have access to independent judicial bodies and that 
these bodies should act on the basis of legal rather than political reasoning (Keohane et 
al. 2000, Zangl/Zürn 2004a), the latter has spread much more widely among interna-
tional institutions than the former. While disputes over alleged breaches of international 
commitments were formerly settled purely through diplomatic channels on the basis of 
states’ interests and power resources, there is a growing tendency to settle such disputes 
by judicial means, through court-like bodies that have to give legal reasons for their 
decisions on the basis of existing international rules. This can be observed particularly 
clearly in international trade. Diplomatic dispute settlement procedures under the GATT 
have been superseded by judicialized dispute settlement procedures under the WTO, 
which has had a remarkable impact on states’ dispute settlement behaviour practices 
(Zangl 2006).  
However, institutionally guaranteed access to the judicial bodies of international in-
stitutions has hardly improved for individual citizens, and access is still usually re-
stricted to states. Individuals who feel disadvantaged because their state or another state 
violates international trade rules are not able to file a complaint with the WTO. They 
can only try to persuade their own state by political means – but not by legal means – to 
alter their trade practices or to lodge a complaint with the WTO against another state’s 
practices. Nor do the international climate, ozone or whaling regimes permit individual 
citizens to take legal action to protect their rights. However, in the European Commu-
nity, individual citizens may invoke domestic courts to refer to the ECJ for a prelimi-
nary ruling (Alter 2001). Only in the field of human rights has access for individuals 
markedly improved. Individual citizens have standing to bring action in the European 
Court for Human Rights (ECHR). Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee is di-
rectly accessible to individuals, although this access is restricted to citizens from states 
which have ratified the so-called Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
Altogether, the democratization and legalization of international institutions have at 
best resulted in semi-constitutionalized decision-making procedures. While public de-
liberation in legislative proceedings and legal reasoning in judicial bodies have become 
more widespread, the institutionalization of principles of individual participation in leg-
islative processes and individual access to judicial review is still rudimentary.  
3.2.2 Transnationalization 
Similar constitutionalization processes can be observed in transnational institutions. 
There is some evidence of a partial democratization of legislative decision-making – 
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again, predominantly through the establishment of procedures that facilitate public de-
liberation (Dingwerth 2007). Many transnational institutions take great care to ensure 
that their legislative processes are transparent to the public, and many also attempt to 
systematically involve stakeholders in the process. When transnational associations 
draw up codes of conduct defining labour, social or environmental standards, or award 
so-called ‘labels’ for good environmental or social practice, they do so in a way that 
ensures transparency and involves relevant stakeholders. The so-called Forest Steward-
ship Council, for instance, not only consults stakeholders, but, directly involves them in 
decision making over certification criteria for sustainable forest management (Conzel-
mann/Wolf 2007; Dingwerth 2007: 144-185).  
As with international institutions, however, opportunities for individual participation 
in transnational organizations’ decision-making processes are few and far between. Sel-
dom do these organizations have directly elected representative bodies. Admittedly, in 
2000 the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) held open, 
on-line elections for some members of its board of directors. This remarkable experi-
ment in representative democracy, however, did little to improve ICANN’s legitimacy; 
in fact, it was alleged by many to be illegitimate because it was dominated by a few 
privileged groups (Bendrath et al. 2007). Institutional guarantees for stakeholder par-
ticipation, generous as they may be, are not a substitute for individual participation. In-
dividuals may not be able to join any stakeholder group that claims to represent their 
interests. Nor can they control which groups are recognized by transnational organiza-
tions as legitimate stakeholder groups. What is more, not all relevant interests are 
equally easily mobilized for political action. As a consequence, individual participation 
in transnational institutions remains precarious. 
Transnational institutions increasingly follow the principles of the rule of law. Inde-
pendent judicial bodies are created to provide, on the basis of legal reasoning, the judi-
cial review of administrative decisions (Lieckweg 2003). This is the case, for example, 
with the so-called lex sportiva, which is no longer applied by obscure committees or 
commissions, but by largely independent, court-like bodies such as the International 
Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) in Lausanne (Lehmkuhl 2004). If disputes arise 
over domain names (lex informatica), independent arbitration panels can be invoked to 
decide whether the contended names constitute an infringement of naming rights. On 
the basis of a ruling given by these arbitration bodies a domain name can even be taken 
off the internet (Leib 2004: 202-208). Many transnational associations that define codes 
of conduct on environmental or social standards or award labels meanwhile also have 
independent judicial panels that provide legally reasoned decisions when disputes arise. 
Interestingly, transnational institutions offer individuals better access to their judicial 
proceedings than international institutions. In certain transnational organizations not 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 76) 
- 16 - 
only their members, but also non-members – and thus anybody – have the right to file 
complaints. For instance, any individual who feels that his or her rights are violated can 
file a complaint with ICANN, which then refers the matter to the independent Interna-
tional Centre for Dispute Resolution for settlement. However, while many transnational 
organizations allow only their members to lodge complaints, even then non-members 
may enjoy indirect access to judicial review proceedings. The Forest Stewardship 
Council, for instance, allows complaints from non-members to be brought to the atten-
tion of its dispute settlement panel if supported by an ordinary member. 
Altogether, the democratization and legalization of transnational organizations have 
resulted in semi-constitutionalized structures. While there has been an increased institu-
tionalization of the principles of public deliberation in legislative processes on the one 
hand, and of legal reasoning in judicial bodies on the other, the institutionalization of 
the principle of individual access to judicial bodies and, to an even greater degree, of 
individual participation in legislative processes still remains weak. 
3.2.3 Privatization 
The trend towards a quasi-constitutionalization of international institutions and transna-
tional organizations cannot be observed in private actors. Indeed, the opposite appears 
to be happening: internal procedures for democratic decision making and judicial re-
view are losing significance for private institutions. Unlike the various private or semi-
private associations and federations that exercised political authority in the parastatal 
sectors under the shadow of state hierarchy in the 1960s and 1970s, private actors par-
ticipating in the administration of authority today rarely have established procedures for 
internal democracy and judicial review. Private authorities address individuals less and 
less as citizens whose ‘voice’ is ensured through appropriate forms of internal democ-
ratic self-legislation and judicial review, but increasingly as clients to whom they offer 
certain, state-approved ‘products of authority’. The ‘clients’, in turn, may either take the 
respective product or leave it in favour of a rival product, i.e. they may use their exit-
option. Legitimation through commodification is particularly manifest in the public ser-
vices – in telecommunications, energy and rail transport, for instance. It is also spread-
ing in social welfare, for example with the introduction of free choice between manda-
tory health insurance companies in Germany in the early 1990s. The ensuing competi-
tion between health insurances severely reduced the significance of the election of in-
surance holders’ representatives in the insurance companies’ administrative councils 
(Rothgang et al. 2006). Similar developments can be witnessed in tertiary education 
policy. For instance, while the German Research Foundation, a quasi-monopolistic, 
self-governing organization founded during the Weimar Republic, is governed through 
its own quasi-democratic and legal procedures, the legitimacy of the new accreditation 
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agencies for university programmes is based more on market competition with rival 
accreditation agencies. If customers are dissatisfied, they may change the agency (Mar-
tens/Wolf 2006). 
To sum up: with the disintegration of the parastatal sector, self-constitutionalization 
loses significance as the basis for the legitimacy of private authorities while market 
competition gains in importance as a source of legitimation. In contrast to international 
and transnational institutions, private authorities undergo a process of de-
constitutionalization. 
3.3 Political Authority beyond the State 
There is a pervasive trend towards a denationalization of political authority. Increas-
ingly international institutions, private actors and transnational organizations lay claim 
to decision-making competences, and/or provide organizational competences and/or, 
develop their own sources of legitimation. The State is no longer the sole repository of 
political authority. Its quasi-monopoly of political power is lost. Nevertheless, the 
power of international institutions, private actors and transnational organizations re-
mains incomplete. International institutions have substantial decision-making compe-
tences, but few organizational capacities; private authorities have organizational compe-
tences but little decision-making competence, while transnational actors have both. In 
view of their legitimacy, however the authority of the latter is just as incomplete as that 
of international and private institutions. The constitutionalization of international insti-
tutions and transnational organizations remains curtailed because they do not allow in-
dividuals access or participatory rights at legislative and judicial proceedings respec-
tively, while the constitutionalization of private actors is completely left undone.  
4 FROM MONOPOLIST TO MANAGER OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
While the denationalization of authority has divested the State of its near-monopoly of 
political rule, it has not deprived it of its statehood. The State remains an institution spe-
cializing in exercising authority within a certain territory, and as such it remains a State. 
Nor has denationalization made the State redundant, for the incompleteness of non-state 
authorities means that these are reliant on support from the State for their legitimacy and 
effectiveness. In order for international institutions, private actors and transnational or-
ganizations to exercise authority, the State must provide them with the authority re-
sources that they themselves do not have. In that sense, denationalization does not con-
stitute a threat to the existence of the State, but has become one of its core functions. 
The State remains central to today’s denationalized political authority structures, but its 
role is changing from that of a monopolist to a manager of authority. It provides com-
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plementary instrumental resources where non-state authorities are lacking in decision-
making competence or organizational power (4.1), and it provides complementary le-
gitimacy where non-state actors are unable to provide adequate legitimacy themselves. 
4.1 Instrumental Complementarity  
The State provides organizational support for international institutions and decision-
making authority for private actors.  
Table 4: Instrumental Complementarity: the State’s Contribution to Non-state Authority 
  Complementary  
Decision making 
Complementary  
Organizational support 
International actors No Yes 
Private actors Yes  None 
Transnational actors Sometimes  Sometimes  
 
Organizational Support for International Actors: As a rule, international institutions 
have no organizational basis of their own; no military forces, no fiscal revenue, no pub-
lic administration. They are therefore not in a position to implement their decisions 
themselves (Zangl/Zürn 2003: 246-267). For example, the UN can issue a directive to 
freeze the assets of listed terrorists and mandate the deployment of troops in crisis re-
gions, but it does not have the capacity to actually freeze accounts, and it does not have 
troops of its own. It must rely on national authorities and national military forces to do 
this. By the same token, while the EU can specify standards for the quality of drinking 
water, it cannot take water samples to test the quality itself. The WTO can issue rules on 
the protection of intellectual property, but does not have the capacity to actually pursue 
copyright violators. The OECD can publish critical reports on the need for reform in, 
say, the Italian school system, but it cannot itself build new schools or restructure edu-
cation in individual countries. And while the international climate conferences can im-
pose reductions in carbon-dioxide emissions, they are just as incapable of shutting down 
outdated brown coal-fired power stations as they are of subsidizing solar or wind-
generated energy. All these tasks have to be dealt with by the State, using its own or-
ganizational powers. If states refuse to provide the necessary organizational compe-
tences, the decisions of international institutions remain unimplemented and ineffective.  
Decision-making for Private Actors: Usually private actors can assume organiza-
tional authority only if the State provides them with a regulatory framework which al-
lows and enables them to do so. If in the past the State took over many organizational 
functions, it was usually because the market failed to fulfil them adequately. Market 
failures can occur, for example, when high entry costs create natural monopolies, as is 
often the case with network infrastructures. Market failures may also occur because – as 
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in the case of defence or public schools – the goods are non-excludible and vulnerable 
to free-riding behaviour. But market failure can also mean that certain organizational 
services such as the postal services or health insurance are not available to everyone 
equally; affordable postal services, for example, are not available in remote areas, and 
affordable health insurance coverage is not available to certain risk groups. In order to 
enlist private actors for such organizational functions, the State has to provide a regula-
tory framework that prevents market failures. To this end the State has to decide, for 
instance, how to secure sufficient returns for private actors delivering post not only in 
downtown areas but also to remote islands, and how, in turn, to induce them to service 
these islands. It has to decide how to secure services to less solvent customers, how to 
structure the competition between network providers and service suppliers in telecom-
munications or rail transport, or how to ensure the equity and fairness of private pension 
insurance schemes. In short then, the privatization of organizational authority makes 
demands on state decision-making competences. The State plays a central role even in 
policy areas in which private companies provide public services. 
Decision-making and Organizational Support for Transnational Actors: Transna-
tional organizations often have both decision-making and organizational competences, 
which leaves them comparatively independent of complementary decision-making and 
organizational competences provided by the State. Nevertheless, as transnational or-
ganizations usually only have very limited means to sanction behaviour positively or 
negatively, their effectiveness often also depends crucially on additional support from 
the State (Conzelmann/Wolf 2007; OECD 2001). The State provides incentives for co-
operation in and compliance with transnational organizations, for example by offering 
financial benefits to private businesses that subscribe to voluntary codes of conduct, or 
by granting tax allowances for donations to charities. It provides a coercive backup for 
transnational organizations, for example, by providing public means for the enforcement 
of private transnational arbitration awards. The success of the lex mercatoria depends 
crucially on the fact that most OECD states have enacted legislation that, firstly, ac-
knowledges transnational arbitration awards as binding; secondly, bars the parties to the 
arbitration from taking their cases to state courts; and, thirdly, requires the state admini-
strations to enforce arbitration awards (Callies 2004). Moreover, as the president of 
ICANN, reflecting on its role in transnational internet governance, emphasized: "[A] 
purely private entity that must depend on the voluntary cooperation of many other enti-
ties is not likely to be able to coordinate anything globally without significant govern-
mental support" (quoted in Hofmann 2005).  
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4.2 Legitimatory Complementarity  
In terms of legitimation, non-state authorities are also reliant on support from the State. 
The State must complement what international, transnational and private authorities 
lack in terms of democracy and the rule of law.  
Table 5: Legitimatory Complementarity: the State’s Contribution to Non-state Authority 
  Democratic  
Principles 
Rule of Law  
Principles 
International actors Yes Yes 
Private actors Yes Yes 
Transnational actors Yes Yes 
 
Legitimation for International Institutions: Although, increasingly, international institu-
tions provide for public deliberation in their legislative decision-making processes and 
for legal reasoning in their dispute settlement procedures, the chances of individual citi-
zens partaking in decision making or gaining direct access to international courts are 
still very restricted. It is precisely here that the complementary support of the State is of 
central importance. Through its participation in international legislation and its access to 
international adjudication, the State is often the only possible intermediary between in-
dividual citizens and international authorities; it represents its citizens before interna-
tional institutions, but also, perhaps even more importantly, it can be held accountable 
by the citizens for the shortcomings of these institutions. The State provides the crucial 
transmission belt that gives citizens voice vis-à-vis international institutions and allows 
them to sanction the failure of international institutions by proxy. Take the BSE crisis in 
2000 as an example: although the crisis was exacerbated by EU decisions, it was na-
tional ministers, and not EU commissioners, who were held to account by the electorate 
– and who, in some cases, had to resign (Scharpf 2007: 8).  
Legitimation for Transnational Actors: While legislative decision-making in transna-
tional organizations usually follows the principles of public deliberation, and their dis-
pute settlement procedures adhere to those of legal reasoning, and sometimes even grant 
individual access, the possibilities for individual citizens to participate in decision mak-
ing are limited and unequal. Some people and stakeholder groups have better access – 
de jure or de facto – than others. And it is often the State which balances inequalities in 
participatory access to transnational organizations. EU member states, for example, en-
sured that the transnational European standardization organizations are open to the par-
ticipation of all relevant stakeholder groups (Joerges et al. 2007). Also, where state rep-
resentatives are involved in such transnational standardization organizations, they act as 
advocates of disadvantaged stakeholders. And in cases where such groups or citizens 
still feel disadvantaged, the State gives them voice through its courts. When ICANN did 
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not allow a representative of web users to examine internal documents, he enforced his 
right through a state court in California.  
Legitimation for Private Actors: Today, the legitimacy of private actors exercising 
public authority is often provided through market-based, competitive mechanisms. 
However, the efficient and effective operation of these mechanisms often requires state 
regulation. The State thus constitutes a central legitimatory anchor of private authority. 
More importantly, the state provides the democratic and judicial procedures by means 
of which it is established which authoritative functions may be delegated to private ac-
tors and, hence, subjected to market competition at all. This is vital, as this act of dele-
gation cannot be legitimated through market competition itself. Indeed, whether it be 
the railways, the postal system, energy providers, security services or pension schemes, 
the issue of privatization regularly gives rise to lengthy, animated parliamentary and 
judicial controversies. The State provides the constitutional framework within which it 
can legitimately be debated whether such authoritative functions can be delegated to 
private actors. Only when it is decided within that framework that privatization may go 
ahead can private actors expect to gain the societal acceptance needed for performing 
their authoritative functions.  
4.3 The State – Manager of Political Authority 
In the OECD world at least, the State remains the central body of political authority. 
While it increasingly shares authority with non-state actors, these actors remain depend-
ent on it. The authority with which they are endowed is fragmentary and incomplete. 
Therefore they often cannot act effectively or legitimately unless the state provides them 
with the authority resources that they themselves lack, be they decision-making powers, 
organizational capacity, or democratic and judicial legitimacy. Thus, the state’s in-
volvement in the exercise of authority remains almost universal; there is hardly a policy 
area in which the state is not involved in one way or another. Nevertheless the nature of 
its involvement has changed fundamentally. The state is no longer a monopolist of au-
thority, determining and controlling all aspects of domestic political rule, but increas-
ingly acts as a manager of political authority which complements, and thereby enables 
and integrates, the diverse and selective authoritative acts of private, transnational or 
international non-state actors. The loss of its near-monopoly of political power certainly 
implies a certain weakening of the autonomy of the State. On the other hand, with the 
help of non-state actors, the State can potentially satisfy demands on political authority 
that it could not satisfy on its own. 
Interestingly, as a manager of political authority, the State is still expected to bear ul-
timate responsibility for everything political. Although there is less and less that the 
State can achieve exclusively on the basis of its own authority, it is still the only actor 
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involved in virtually all acts of political authority. Authority structures are increasingly 
denationalized, but the State remains the hub that holds these denationalized structures 
together. And as such it is called to account wherever non-state political authorities fail 
to meet expectations. Of course, the expectations placed on the State as the ultimate 
bearer of political responsibility are hard to meet, precisely because the State has lost its 
former, near-exclusive control over political authority. At the same time, it also reveals 
the persistent strength of the State inasmuch as clearly only the State is deemed capable 
of assuming ultimate responsibility. Hence, the most striking feature of the State as 
manager of authority is not that it is weaker or stronger than it was as a monopolist of 
authority, but that it is different. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The findings of our empirical exploration can be summarized as follows: Since the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century, the gradual nationalization of political authority that 
was typical for much of the State’s history since the seventeenth century has come to a 
standstill and given way to the denationalization of political authority. Non-state actors 
acquire political authority, thus giving rise to a complex and heterogeneous network of 
political authorities, in which the State is only one authority among others. Second, the 
denationalization of political authority remains fragmentary and incomplete. No non-
state authority, be it an international institution, a private business or transnational or-
ganization, has the capacity to supplant the State. In fact, they all remain reliant on the 
State because only the State can provide the complementary resources that non-state 
actors lack to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately. Third, for this 
reason, the State remains the key body of authority despite denationalization and the 
accretion of political authority by non-state entities. Its role has changed, however. The 
State no longer exercises authority always directly and exclusively through its own 
powers and resources, but more and more indirectly, by providing and complementing 
the powers and resources of non-state actors.  
How do our findings reflect on the three perspectives on the State mentioned in the 
introduction? First, and least surprisingly, they disprove the conjecture that the State is 
generally weakening. Yet, they also show that the State is weaker in at least one crucial 
respect, namely as a monopolist of political authority. Second, the findings confirm the 
statist presumption that it continues to be a key actor in political affairs. However, con-
trary to statist instincts this is no longer solely or even most importantly due to the 
State’s exclusive hold on vital authoritative functions, but increasingly on its indispen-
sability as a manager and facilitator of the authoritative functions of non-state actors. 
Finally, the findings suggest that the governance perspective remains fundamentally 
incomplete as long as it focuses exclusively on the authority functions of non-state insti-
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tutions, and thereby overlooks how these institutions interact with and depend on sup-
port from state authorities. State and non-state authority are complements rather than 
substitutes. Effective, legitimate governance beyond the State depends on effective, 
legitimate states rather than on their replacement. The state remains the central node in 
an increasingly decentralized authority structure.3 
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